The Dynamics of Derogation: Article 15 of the ECHR Explored
Introduction
Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a derogation clause which authorises contracting parties, in exceptional circumstances, to enact measures which may encroach upon freedoms ordinarily protected by the ECHR.(1) The Article comprises three parts(2), the first (1) of which outlines the substantive requirements for valid derogation(3), the second (2) of which safeguards inviolable rights(4), and the third (3) of which delineates the procedural requirements(5) for derogation.
In critically examining Article 15 jurisprudence, this article shall argue that, notwithstanding the stringent wording of Article 15(6), the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been materially deferential in its substantive assessment of derogations’ validity and its oversight of procedural compliance.
Article 15(1) – Substantive Requirements
Article 15(1) specifies two substantive tests which must be satisfied by state parties to invoke valid derogation powers(7). First, the state must be in “a time of war” or facing a “public emergency threatening the life of the nation”. Notably, the meaning of “war” has, thus far, not required interpretation by the ECtHR(8). Second, the enacted measures must be strictly necessitated by the exigencies of the emergency i.e., proportional(9) to the crisis. The Court’s interpretation of both criteria shall be considered in turn.
‘Public Emergency Threatening the Life of a Nation'
The “natural and customary” meaning of this notion was first(10) described in Lawless v. Ireland(11) as “an exceptional situation of crisis and emergency which affects the whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community”(12). Pursuant to subsequent caselaw, a public emergency must also be “actual or imminent”(13) and exceptional in nature to the extent that mitigating measures ordinarily permissible under a liberal-democratic order are ineffectual(14). Indeed, in Denmark and others v. Greece(15) the European Commission of Human Rights (ECmHR) rejected a state’s claim of public emergency on foot of the fact that the qualifying feature of “imminence” was absent(16), viz., the alleged communist takeover was tantamount to mere political instability(17).
The ambit of the term was further expounded(18) by subsequent caselaw(19) to include crises whose geographic scope is limited to one particular region of the State. In Aksoy v. Turkey(20) the ECtHR held that the “extent and impact of PKK terrorist activity in South-East Turkey [had] undoubtedly created, in the region concerned, a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’”(21). In doing so, the Court demonstrated its emphasis on the magnitude of the nationwide effects of the threat, rather than its geographical scope(22).
Expanding State Discretion: A Shift in Jurisprudence
While the notional meaning of “public emergency” has remained largely consistent following Lawless, the margin of appreciation accorded to state authorities in ascertaining the existence of such an emergency has been drastically widened(23).
In early Article 15 cases, the ECmHR and ECtHR often held that a state’s discretion in appreciating ‘the threat to the life of the nation’ exists “within certain limits”(24), and that “it is for the Court to determine whether the conditions laid down in Article 15 for the exercise of the exceptional right of derogation have been fulfilled”(25). However, the case of Ireland v. UK(26) signals a major jurisprudential shift in this respect(27). In Ireland, the Court refrained from independently inquiring into the existence of a public emergency(28), instead holding that:
By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the pressing needs of the moment, the national authorities are in principle in a better position than the international judge to decide on the presence of such an emergency….In this matter Article 15 para. 1 leaves those authorities a wide margin of appreciation.(29)
This stance was recalled and followed in several subsequent cases(30), and approved by the Grand Chamber in A and Others v. UK(31). Indeed, in the latter case, the ECtHR went one step further in affording discretion to national authorities by holding that, as the House of Lords had previously ascertained the existence of an emergency(32), the need for an independent review of the threat was obviated(33)¾the ECtHR would only challenge the finding if it was “manifestly unreasonable” or if it was satisfied that the domestic court “had misinterpreted or misapplied” Article 15 jurisprudence(34). This approach may be highly controversial particularly considering the domestic court itself proffered little scrutiny of the executive’s assessment(35).
Arguably, excessive deference to national authorities’ conclusions on the existence of a “public emergency” may enable the creation of unduly entrenched emergencies(36) and undermine the role of Article 15 in preserving human rights in times of crisis. The protective capacity of a derogation clause lies primarily in the schism it creates between normalcy and emergency(37). This demarcation is substantially blurred, however, when a low degree of scrutiny is proffered by the Court in respect of the existence of a public emergency. Eroding this normalcy-emergency dichotomy risks emergency measures becoming normalised and perpetuated in ordinary times(38).
The ECtHR’s permissive approach to emergencies may be evidenced by the fact that it has only once overruled a national authority’s assertion on the existence of an emergency(39). In Dareskizb Ltd v. Armenia(40), the Court found that notwithstanding the “very tense” nature of post-election demonstrations in Yerevan, these did not threaten the life of the nation within the meaning of Article 15(41). In its assessment, the Court notably distinguished the case from A and Others(42) on the basis that the Armenian executive’s assertions on the existence of a state of emergency were “never subjected to any judicial scrutiny at the domestic level”; implying it would thus attach less weight to them(43).
Proportionality of Measures: The Crucial Test
While the Court is largely deferential in respect of the first limb of Article 15(1), it arguably undertakes a slightly more exacting review of the enacted measures’ proportionality i.e., the second limb(44). Indeed, this element has been regarded in literature as the most important to the outcome of Article 15 cases(45).
Essentially, the proportionality test questions whether the extent to which derogable rights are curtailed is strictly necessitated by the nature of the crisis facing national authorities(46). In conducting this review, the ECtHR considers inter alia, the cause and duration of the emergency; whether ordinary law is adequate to address it(47); the geographical scope of the emergency measures(48); the nature of the compromised rights(49), whether procedural safeguards against abuse of power were implemented(50), whether less invasive measures were feasible(51), whether the measures were unjustifiably discriminatory(52), whether they were “lawful”(53), and whether they were a “genuine response” to the crisis(54).
Well-established caselaw reveals that the implementation of effective procedural safeguards against the abuse of emergency powers is a key factor in the Court’s assessment(55). In Aksoy, the ECtHR ruled that the applicant’s 14-day incommunicado detention was disproportionate due to the inadequacy of safeguards against arbitrary treatment(56), namely, “the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence of any realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the legality of the detention”(57). Further, in Demir and others v. Turkey(58), the ECtHR stressed that guarantees against abuse of power must be real and effective. In reviewing the applicants’ incommunicado detention, the Court observed that although their lawyer could lodge a complaint against the prosecuting authorities, this was not an effective safeguard given they were deprived of contact with their lawyer(59). In the absence of real safeguards, the detention in issue was ruled disproportionate(60). Very recently, the Court has also criticised the lack of “speediness” characterising judicial oversight of the legality of detentions(61).
In cases arising in the aftermath of the Turkish 2016 attempted coup, the ECtHR has also established that measures which undermine the foundations of democratic society and are unnecessary for the exercise of emergency powers will not be “strictly required”(62). Rather, as the Court stressed in Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey(63)¾a case concerning a journalist’s prolonged pre-trial detention¾emergency measures must seek to “protect the democratic order from the threats to it” and safeguard core democratic values such as broadmindedness, tolerance, and pluralism(64). In holding that the said detention was disproportionate, the ECtHR noted that pre-trial detention should be considered “an exceptional measure of last resort” i.e., one which ought to be adopted only when all other measures have proved ineffectual(65). The Court also underlined, on a broader level, the adverse chilling effect which the pre-trial detention of government critics has on freedom of expression and civil society as a whole(66).
Terrorism-related Jurisprudence: A Low Degree of Scrutiny
Although in recent Turkish 2016 attempted coup cases emergency measures have been repeatedly ruled disproportionate by the ECtHR, a far less stringent review was arguably undertaken in earlier cases often concerning terrorist violence(67). While in Lawless no reference is made to the notion of margin of appreciation, the Court in Ireland implicitly relies on it in stating that the disputed internment could “reasonably have been considered strictly required for the protection of public security”(68). In Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom(69), the ECtHR goes one step further and undertakes a distinctly negative review of the disputed measures’ proportionality, underlining the paramountcy of the national authorities’ judgment on what is strictly required(70). Indeed, the Court’s assessment on proportionality¾which is not particularly rigorous¾is couched in the negative: “it cannot be said that the government have exceeded their margin of appreciation”(71). Arguably, the application of a low degree of scrutiny in this respect seems to be explicitly opposed by the rigid formulation of Article 15(1), viz., that measures must be “strictly required” by the exigencies of the crisis(72).
It is significant to note that Article 15(1) also mandates derogations’ consistency with international obligations(73), although this criterion has rarely surfaced in Article 15 jurisprudence thus far(74).
Article 15(3) – Procedural Requirements: A Mere Formality
The final clause of Article 15 requires contracting states to “keep the Secretary General of the Council of Europe fully informed of the measures which it has taken and the reasons therefor”(75). Although the wording of the clause appears stringent, it has largely been interpreted by the Court as a mere formal element rather than an effective safeguard against the misuse of derogation powers(76).
In Lawless, the Court manifestly altered the order by which Article 15 requirements were previously examined(77); namely, by first undertaking a substantive review of the derogations then ascertaining the fulfilment of the notification requirement. Subsequently, the ECtHR in Ireland refrained from undertaking a substantive assessment of the notification criterion, simply stating that “the British notices of derogation...fulfilled the requirements of Article 15 para. 3”(78). Furthermore, in Brannigan, a British derogation notice was accepted although the government had not yet reached a “firm and final view” on the necessity of the measures and the reasons therefor(79).
As a line of recent caselaw demonstrates(80), there is no requirement for derogation notices to explicitly stipulate which Articles of the ECHR form the subject of derogation. Indeed, in Şahin Alpay v. Turkey(81) and Ahmet Hüsrev Altan v. Turkey(82), the Court held that procedural requirements were fulfilled despite the Turkish derogation notice merely announcing that “measures taken may involve derogation from the obligations under the Convention”(83), as this matter was not in dispute(84).
In light of such caselaw, Van Der Sloot observes that Article 15(3) “has lost most if not all of its importance in the most recent decisions”(85). Arguably, acquiescence to vague notifications hampers the Court’s capacity to supervise derogation powers(86) and other states’ capacity to potentially file an inter-State complaint(87).
Conclusion
In conclusion, although Article 15 of the ECHR is designed to establish a legal framework for derogation from specific provisions during times of war or public emergency, its implementation and oversight by the ECtHR raise significant concerns. Relevant jurisprudence demonstrates a marked deference to national authorities, particularly in the determination of what constitutes a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. This wide margin of appreciation, first clearly articulated in Ireland v. UK, allows states considerable leeway in declaring emergencies, potentially leading to the normalisation and entrenchment of emergency measures.
The Court’s scrutiny of the proportionality of derogatory measures, while somewhat more rigorous, still reveals a tendency to defer to national judgments, especially in cases related to terrorism and political instability. Although recent jurisprudence, particularly in the context of Turkey’s 2016 attempted coup, shows a more exacting review, the historical pattern of deference undermines the protective capacity of Article 15. The stringent wording of Article 15(1), which mandates that measures be “strictly required”, appears to be diluted by the Court’s approach.
Furthermore, the procedural requirements enshrined in Article 15(3), designed to ensure transparency and accountability through notifications to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, have been relegated to the status of mere formalities. The Court’s lenient stance on vague and incomplete notifications weakens the overall supervisory mechanism, reducing the potential for effective oversight and inter-State complaints.
Ultimately, the ECtHR’s effort to maintain subsidiarity and ensure deference in respect of both substantive and procedural Article 15 compliance risks severely undercutting the Article’s raison d'être: to limit the tendency of state parties to suspend rights in response to crises. The strong supervisory role envisioned for the ECtHR in the text of Article 15 has simply not yet ensued. Strengthening the Court’s independent scrutiny of emergency declarations and derogatory measures is crucial to preserving the integrity of human rights safeguards under the ECHR framework.
Footnotes:
(1) Alan Greene, “Separating Normalcy from Emergency: The Jurisprudence of Article 15 of the European Convention (2011) 12(10) German Law Journal 1764, at 1769.
(2)R. St. J. MacDonald, “Derogations under Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (1998) 36 Colum J Transnat'l L 225, at 235-252.
(3) F. O. Iloh & Steve-Ross A. Omisore, “A Critical Analysis of the Conditions for State of Emergency” (2021) 3 IRLJ 47, at 50-52.
(4)R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 248.
(5) Frederick Cowell, “Sovereignty and the Question of Derogation: An Analysis of Article 15 of the ECHR and the Absence of a Derogation Clause in the ACHPR” (2013) 1 Birkbeck L Rev 135, at 148.
(6)Ibid., at 149. See also; Alan Greene, note 1.
(7)David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, (5th ed., Oxford University Press, 2022), at 818-819.
(8)Pieter van Dijk et al, Theory and practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1998). See also; Frederick Cowell, note 5, at 145, and R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 235.
(9)Frederick Cowell, note 5, at 146-148.
(10)Alan Greene, note 1, at 1776.
(11)App no 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961. Hereinafter referred to as Lawless.
(12) Ibid. at [28].
(13)Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece App Nos 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, Judgment of 1969, at [53]. Here, the ECtHR, recognised that the authentic French judgment of Lawless described an emergency as one which is not only exceptional, but also “imminent” in nature.
(14)Ibid. See also; Aly Mokhtar, “Human Rights Obligations v. Derogations: Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights” (2004) 8 Int'l J Hum Rts 65, at 70, Alan Greene, note 1, at 1772, and Zhao Jianwen, "On the Derogation Clause of the Human Rights Convention" (1996) 5 The Jurist, at 9-10.
(15) App Nos 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67, 3344/67, Report of the Commission on 5 November 1969. Hereinafter referred to as the Greek case.
(16)Ibid., at 72-75.
(17) Ibid.
(18) Bart Van Der Sloot, “Is All Fair in Love and War: An Analysis of the Case Law on Article 15 ECHR” (2014) 53 Mil L & L War Rev 319, at 343-345. See also; R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 239-240.
(19) Ireland v. the United Kingdom App no 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978, at [205]. See also Aksoy v. Turkey App no 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996, at [70], and Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom App nos 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, at [47].
(20)App no 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996. Hereinafter referred to as Aksoy.
(21) Ibid., at [70]. Emphasis added.
(22)J.E.S. Fawcett, The Application Of The European Convention On Human Rights (2nd ed., Clarendon Press, 1987), at 308. See also; Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 69.
(23) Mariniello T, “Prolonged Emergency and Derogation of Human Rights: Why the European Court Should Raise Its Immunity System” (2019) 20 German Law Journal 46, at 49. See also; M. J. Bossuyt, Guide to the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987), at 87, Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 323, Turkut, Emre, "Accommodating Security Imperatives v. Protecting Fundamental Rights" (2018) Security and Human Rights 28(1–4) 62, and Ireland v. UK App. No. 5310/71, at [207].
(24) Greece v. United Kingdom App no 176/56, Report of the Commission on 26 September 1958, at [136].
(25) Lawless v. Ireland App no. 332/57, Judgment of 1 July 1961, at [22]. Emphasis added.
(26)Ireland v. the United Kingdom App no 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978. Hereinafter referred to as Ireland.
(27) Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 324.
(28)David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 826.
(29) Ireland v. the United Kingdom App no 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978, at [207]. See also; Gary Lawson, “Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times: Commons Sense in Times of Crisis” (2007) 87 BUL REV 289, at 311, and Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror In The Balance: Security, Liberty And The Courts (2007), at 45.
(30) Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom App nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, at [43]. See also; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey App. No. 16538/17, Judgment of 20 June 2018, at [75], and Dareskizb Ltd v. Armenia App no 61737/08, Judgment of 21 September 2021, at [57], Aksoy v. Turkey App no 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996, at [68], and Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey App no 13237/17, Judgment of 20 March 2018, at [91], and Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 73.
(31)App no 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009 (GC), at [173] and [177]. Hereinafter referred to as A and Others.
(32) A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56.
(33) Frederick Cowell, note 5, at 146. See also; Alan Greene, note 1, at 1778-1779.
(34)App no 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009 (GC), at [174].
(35) A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 56. See also; Doswald-Beck, Human Rights in Times of Conflict and Terrorism (2011), at 88, David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 822, and David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution Of Law: Legality In A Time Of Emergency (Cambridge University Press, 2006), at 179.
(36)Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics In An Age Of Terror (Edinburgh Univeristy Press 2005); David Cole, “Enemy Aliens” (2002) 54 STAN L REV 953, at 955. See also; Oren Gross, “Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises always be Constitutional?” (2003) 112 YALE LJ 1011, at 1089-1094.
(37) Alan Greene, note 1, at 1776.
(38)Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms while Countering Terrorism on the Human Rights Challenge of States of
Emergency in the Context of Countering Terrorism' UN Doc A/HRC/37/52 (1 March 2018), at [27]. See also; Stuart Wallace, “Derogations from the European Convention on Human Rights: The Case for Reform” (2020) 20 Human Rights Law Review 769, at 776, and Alan Greene, note 1, at 1765-1766.
(39)In the Greek case, it was the ECmHR that did so – the case did not reach the ECtHR. See also; David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 820.
(40)App no 61737/08, Judgment of 21 September 2021.
(41) Ibid., at [62]-[63].
(42)App no 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009 (GC), at [177].
(43)App no 61737/08, Judgment of 21 September 2021, at [58]. See also; David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 821.
(44) Alan Greene, note 1, at 142. See also; R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 258.
(45)David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 818. See also; Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 339, and Alan Greene, note 1, at 1779-1781.
(46) A and Others v. UK App no 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009 (GC), at [185]. See also; David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 827, Jaime Oraa, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law (Clarendon Press, 1992), and Ronald St.J. Macdonald, Franz Matscher, and Herbert Petzold, The European System for the protection of human rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993), at 125.
(47) D.J. Harris, M. O'Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (London, Dublin, Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1995), at 493-494. See also; Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 72.
(48) R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 244. See also; Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 71.
(49) Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom App nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, at [43]. See also; Jizeng Fan & Yuhong Wang, 'The Principle of Proportionality toward Risk Prevention - Based on the Judgment Logic of European COVID-19 Derogation Measures' (2021) 20 J Hum Rts 598, at 612, Pieter van Dijk and Godefridus J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers,1993), at 739, and Prateek Joinwal, “Enforcing Multilateral Treaties in a Public Emergency: A Note on Limitations and Derogations to the International Human Rights Framework” (2021) 11 King's Student L Rev 96, at 101 and 102.
(50)Alparslan Altan v. Turkey App no 12778/17, Judgment of 16 April 2019, at [116].
(51)Brendan Mangan, “Protecting Human Rights in National Emergencies: Shortcomings in the European System
and a Proposal of Reform” (1998) 10 Human Rights Quarterly, at 372.
(52)A and Others v. The United Kingdom App. No. 3455/05, Judgment of 19 February 2009, at [190].
(53) Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey App. No. 13237/17, Judgment of 20 March 2018, at 140. See also; Sahin Alpay v. Turkey App. No. 16538/17, Judgment of 20 June 2018, at 119.
(54) Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom App nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, at [51]. See also; Alparslan Altan v. Turkey App no 12778/17, Judgment of 16 April 2019, at [118].
(55)Lawless v. Ireland (no. 3), at 37. See also; Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, at [61]-[65], Aksoy v. Turkey at [79]-[84], and Ireland v. the United Kingdom, at [216]-[219].
(56)App no 21987/93, Judgment of 1996, at [79]-[84].
(57)Ibid., at [83].
(58)App no 71/1997/855/1062–1064, Judgment of 23 September 1998.
(59)Ibid., at [56].
(60)Ibid., at [57].
(61)Baş v. Turkey, App no 66448/17, Judgment of 3 March 2020, at [216] and [230]. See also Kavala v. Turkey App no 28749/18, Judgment of 10 December 2019, at [176]-[196].
(62) Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey App no 13237/17, Judgment of 20 March 2018, at [210]. See also; Şahin Alpay v. Turkey App no 16538/17, Judgment of 20 March 2018, at [180].
(63) App no 13237/17, Judgment of 2018.
(64) Ibid., at [210].
(65) Ibid., at [211].
(66)Ibid., at [212].
(67)David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 836-837. See also; R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 245, Y Arai-Takahashi, The Margin Of Appreciation Doctrine And The Principle Of Proportionality In The Jurisprudence Of The ECHR (Intersentia, 2001), and Alan Greene, note 1, at 1783.
(68)Ireland v. UK App. No. 5310/71, at [213].
(69) App nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993. Hereinafter referred to as Brannigan.
(70)Ibid., at [57], [60], and [66]. See also the dissenting opinion of judge Makarczyk, at [3].
(71)Ibid., at [60]. Emphasis added.
(72)Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 72. See also; R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 245, and David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 836.
(73) R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 245-248.
(74)Francis G. Jacobs, Robin C.A. White, The European Convention on Human Rights (2nd ed., Oxford, New York:
Clarendon Press, 1996), at 320. See also; David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 837, and Mariniello T, note 23, at 50.
(75) Emphasis added. See; Mariniello T, note 23, at 50, R. St. J. MacDonald, note 2, at 249-252, M. J. Bossuyt, note 23, at 97, and Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 320.
(76)Aly Mokhtar, note 14, at 76. See also; David Harris, Michael O'Boyle, Ed Bates, and Carla M. Buckley, note 7, at 839-841.
(77)Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 327.
(78)Ireland v. UK App. No. 5310/71, at [223].
(79) App nos. 14553/89 & 14554/89, Judgment of 25 May 1993, at [31], and [52]-[54]. See also; Mariniello T, note 23, at 63.
(80)Mehmet Hasan Altan v. Turkey App no 13237/17, Judgment of 20 March 2018, at [89].
(81) App. No 16538/17, at [73].
(82) App no 13252/17, Judgment of 13 April 2021, at [100]-[102].
(83) Ibid., at [100]. Emphasis added.
(84) Ibid., at [101].
(85) Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 330.
(86)T Mariniello, note 23, at 70. See also; Stuart Wallace, note 38, at 783-784, Eric Richardson and Colleen Devine, “Emergencies End Eventually: How to Better Analyze Human Rights Restrictions Sparked by the COVID-19 Pandemic Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights” (2020) 42 Mich. J. Int'l L 105, at 111, and Prateek Joinwal, note 49, at 117-118.
(87) M. J. Bossuyt, note 23, at 97. See also; Bart Van Der Sloot, note 18, at 320, Eric Richardson and Colleen Devine, note 86, at 125, and Emilie M. Hafner-Burton et al., “Emergency and Escape: Explaining Derogations from Human Rights Treaties” (2011) 65 Int'l Org 673, at 677.
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